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Abstract 
Ecological Economics has developed as a "transdisciplinary science," but it has 
not taken significant steps toward a truly integrated process of evaluating anthropogenic 
ecological change.  The emerging dominance within ecological economics of the 
movement to monetize "ecological services," when combined with the already well-
entrenched dominance of contingent pricing as a means to evaluate impacts on amenities, 
has created a "monistic" approach to valuation studies.  It is argued that this monistic 
approach to evaluating anthropogenic impacts is inconsistent with a sophisticated 
conception of ecology as a complex science that rests on shifting metaphors.  An 
alternative, pluralistic and iterative approach to valuation of anthropogenic ecological 
change is proposed. 
 
What do you get if you cross an economist and an ecologist?  While genetic 
technology has (thankfully) not yet allowed for this experiment to be attempted at the 
level of the individual, over the last 20 years the field of ecological economics has 
emerged and grown as a result of just this type of cross-fertilization at the disciplinary 
level.  As nurtured through ISEE conferences, other national ISEE meetings, in colleges 
and agencies, and in the writings in the journal, Ecological Economics, the field is the 
result of a sustained experiment in integrated ecological and economic understanding of 
environmental problems and the challenge of sustainable living.  Is the post-disciplinary, 
trans-disciplinary chimera that stands before us a fulfillment of the vision that gave it 
birth?  Or are we feeding a beast that does not serve the purpose for which it was 
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designed?  Perhaps it is time to evaluate the direction and standing of the field of 
ecological economics. 
 A report card, however informal, may be timely because, as we understand the 
current situation, the trans-disciplinary field of ecological economics faces an important 
choice, a crossroads that will determine its future shape as a discipline and will 
determine--for us at least—whether the experiment has been a success.  If one judges the 
field of ecological economics on the basis of our learning about the interactions of 
ecological and economic forces and the importance of their interpenetration, we believe 
great progress has been made. If, however, one were to ask whether the practitioners of 
ecological economics have evolved a new framework for evaluating ecological and 
economic impacts of anthropogenic change, we think the only honest answer is, "No; and 
progress, much less success, in developing that framework has been elusive."  The 
shortcoming lies not in association with the old, conventional framework, but rather with 
inaction in developing compelling alternative. 
Ecologists still think like ecologists and economists still think like economists. 
While practitioners in both fields have learned from the cross-fertilization, so far 
ecological economics has only succeeded in harnessing two complementary disciplines 
and created a forum for discussing policy in a context informed by both. This is no mean 
accomplishment, but it merely places the field at a cross-roads.  Will the "field" of 
ecological economics go forward with two sets of methodologies, applying descriptive 
and hypothesis-testing methods when uncertainty is faced, and applying economic value 
measurement methods using direct and indirect methods to establish willingness to pay 
(WTP) for goods and services as methods for evaluating those changes?  
If the field does remain dualistic in this sense, it will be a result of confusion 
surrounding positivism's commitment to value neutrality in science.  Ecologists, many of 
whom cling to value neutrality as if their science depends upon it, are anxious to shift 
responsibility regarding valuation to others; and once ecologists and economists began 
working closely together, the ecologists have simply ceded the ground to economic 
analysis, without challenging the mainstream economists' fiction that economics, itself, 
can be "positive" and value neutral (Arrow et al., 2004).  One would look in vain among 
the writings of logical positivists of the Vienna Circle for a more impassioned 
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commitment to positivism than is expressed by Milton Friedman and other advocates of 
free markets (Friedman, 1962).  In the area of environmental valuation studies (the 
subfield that estimates values associated with anthropogenic environmental change), the 
myth of positivism appears as the fiction that economists' valuation studies merely 
measure human behavior in the search for human welfare.   
While space does not permit a full-out refutation of this myth, here,1 we simply 
note that positivism and its commitments to value neutrality have lost all plausibility 
given our developing understanding of the complex role of assumptions and metaphors 
play in the development of all "models", whether models of human behavior or models of 
galaxies.  In the present case, it is simply not plausible for environmental economists, 
operating on the implicit metaphor of earth as a welfare-producing machine, to use that 
hidden metaphor to narrow the ways one can legitimately value, or express one's values 
toward, nature, and then claim that their measures are "value free."  The metaphor of 
welfare machine illuminates one type of values drawn from nature while, for example, a 
metaphor of nature as "home" to ecological communities, or John Muir's insisting the 
forests were "man's cathedrals, and each of these metaphors highlights different values. 
Our point, then, is that assumptions built into the model, confusedly called 
"positive" by mainstream economists, and adopted more and more by ecological 
economists, cannot be "positive".  When ecologists buy into the economic model for 
"valuing change," they simply embrace one of the many metaphors necessary to 
comprehend the complexities of environmental changes and their impacts on humans.   
What is interesting about the tendency of economists and ecologists to continue to 
think disciplinarily within ecological economics, is that they are both following the 
dictates of the positivist ideal of value neutrality.  Ecologists, worried that they will not 
be viewed as sufficiently "objective" and "scientific," refuse to consider the important 
role of values in the development and use of ecological models.2  Economists, worried 
that they will violate their oath as value-neutral, "positive" social scientists, claim their 
measurement of welfare based on the measurement of preferences is "positive" science.  
1 For an all-out argument against the positivist myth of a fact-value dichotomy, see 
Norton, (2005, especially Ch. 3 and Part 9.3). 
2 This point has been made before (Norton, 1998). made before.   
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Positivism, however, has lost all credibility in the philosophy of science, and positivism 
in both economics and ecology has led to a dead end in attempts to characterize the 
impacts of environmental change.  To limit such measurement to descriptions of welfare 
change cannot reflect the diversity and complexity of human interactions with, and 
evaluation of, the constantly changing, dynamic environment as conceived by ecologists. 
The alternative is to seek a new approach to evaluating change, an approach that 
takes into account insights from both economics and ecology.  For us the key question 
regarding the successful integration of ecological and economic science depends upon 
whether the new field creates a new and more satisfactory approach to evaluating 
changes that occur as a result of human activities.  In this area, we think ecological 
economics has a long way to go.  More urgently, as we read randomly in the field, we do 
not even see progress toward this goal.   
Having already invoked the cliché of a field at a cross-roads, we might as well say 
that a "wrong turn" is being taken.  If we correctly read the turn signals indicated by the 
mix of articles and books published in the discipline recently, the field is moving away 
from, not toward, a truly integrated conception of how we might meaningfully evaluate 
ecological and environmental change.  In this paper, we argue that, in order to truly 
reform environmental policy according to ecological and economic principles, it will be 
necessary to develop a new, pluralistic, multi-scalar, and multi-criteria method of 
evaluating anthropogenic changes to natural and social systems. 
Let us be clear:  we do not oppose making, publicizing, and discussing estimates 
of economic values; nor do we think this way of framing some research questions is 
incompatible with pluralism.  What worries us is that the current enthusiasm for 
ecosystem service methods (used in tandem with contingent valuation methods) has 
locked the rhetoric of environmental evaluation in a very monistic, utilitarian, and 
economic vernacular that leaves little or no room for other social scientific methods, or 
for appeal to philosophical reasons or theological ideals.  It also discourages a more 
profound re-examination of how one might create a rational process of policy evaluation 
that truly takes into account both economic and ecological impacts of our decisions.  At 
the very least, enthusiastic pursuit of monistic analysis serves to distract the ecological 
economics from genuine development. 
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One of us, as a philosopher, was attracted into the fringes of the discipline of 
ecological economics by the possibility of finding a community of scholars who were 
seeking a new way to conceptualize and count the impacts of economic and policy 
decisions on ecological systems and processes.  But we hear less and less discussion of 
these deep issues as ecological economists have embraced quantitative analysis of non-
market values and ecosystem services as the means to identify, monetize, and count 
environmental values in virtually every circumstance and context.  Even if one grants—
and we believe the jury is still out on this question—that placing dollar values on 
ecosystem services can be rhetorically effective, we still worry that the discipline of 
ecological economics is being swept by a tide of dollar-valuations toward a monistic 
methodology of estimating and aggregating benefits in dollar terms only.  If so, 
pluralism—what we think is the most promising avenue toward a new, integrated 
approach to evaluation—will never be given a chance.  If that happens, ecological 
economics will remain two mutually interactive disciplines yoked together in a dualistic 
discourse:  Ecologists will describe change; those economists engaged in valuation 
studies will measure change in their monistic, monetary vocabulary, and their discourse 
will never provide novel insights about how to truly integrate the diverse factors that 
must go into a comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of policy change.  Our criticisms 
of the field, then, do not derive from its association with mainstream economics.  Rather 
than guilt by association, we see guilt by inaction in developing a pluralistic framework.  
Thus, this article is best understood as a call for action in a field at a crossroads.   
Part I: The Choice: Monism or Pluralism 
To explain the choice we think the field faces, we introduce a useful distinction— 
originally applied to ethical approaches to environmental policy analysis by the legal 
scholar, Christopher Stone—between "monistic" and "pluralistic" approaches to the 
evaluation of environmental outcomes.  Monistic approaches to evaluation attempt to 
represent all environmental value in one framework of analysis—such as utilitarianism, 
cost-benefit analysis, or rights theory.  Pluralistic theories, on the other hand, do not 
attempt to enforce a universal vocabulary upon the discourse of environmental value.   
The monistic approaches are thought by many to have an advantage in that, given their 
requirement that all values must be expressed in one vernacular, they can at least claim to 
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be comparing comparables, and they can provide some hope of a definitive and decisive 
outcome in the form of a final accounting in a single system of analysis.  Pluralistic 
theories, on the other hand, seem messy and confusing to interpret, leaving all kinds of 
open questions when our evaluative criteria point in different directions.  We argue, 
however, that environmental problems are messy, often involving conflicts between 
competing goods, and that embracing—and somehow learning to manage—a pluralistic 
and diverse evaluation process seems more likely to be useful than seeking algorithmic 
predictions of costs and benefits or by assigning rights to more and more elements of 
nature. Messy environmental problems may best be addressed by pluralistic and diverse 
evaluation processes, not by a single, uniform evaluation process.  Unlike monism, which 
starts by converting values to a single vernacular, pluralism accepts the fact of 
pluralism—the fact that people express their values toward nature in many vernaculars, 
and then seeks a methodology that will make sense of the cacophony (Minteer and 
Manning, 1999).  Monism converts those expressions into a single vernacular, like a 
translator at the United Nations.  Monism finds and uses a common tongue (fraught with 
the many problems associated with translation, especially in nuanced contexts), while 
pluralism retains the original expressions and seeks another frame for analysis.  Is there 
another frame, another evaluative unit, than what monism employs? 
Using this distinction, we can state our current concern:  we fear ecological 
economics is drifting—maybe even stampeding—in the direction of monism, both in 
conceptualization and in accounting, in evaluating environmental change.  The onrush of 
journal articles, federal and nonfederal grant programs, and policy analyses that use or 
support ecological services valuation may crowd-out other approaches.  Unless we are 
mistaken, the trend in ecological economics is toward a single quantification of 
environmental values in terms of dollars of impact on human welfare.  Use values are 
more and more counted in terms of dollars-worth of ecosystem services, while non-use 
values are explored mainly through various elicitation techniques, all designed to assign a 
dollar value to some element, aspect, or attribute of natural systems.  Both types of 
values, however diverse, must be interpreted, on this monistic view as individual values, 
individual values that are aggregated in units like dollars. While there remain differences 
and disagreements about the direct comparability of economists' estimates of market 
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values at the margins with estimates of dollar values derived from "ecosystem services," 
as will be explored in more detail below in Part II, the overall trend seems to be toward 
entering policy frays with a single sword: the aggregated dollar value of goods, 
services—welfare—derived by humans from nature.  This distracts us from stampeding 
in new directions. 
Norton (2005, Part 4.1) argues in detail that most environmental problems have 
the classic characteristics of "Wicked Problems," as defined by Rittel and Webber (1973).  
Discussants, that is, cannot agree on problem formulation because their conflicting 
interests cause them to characterize the problem differently.  Trying to force all values at 
issue into a single, monistic framework leads to a politics of ideology and exclusion, as 
interest groups that define the problem differently struggle to gain control of public 
discourse and enforce the methodology that yields "one right answer".  Issues of value 
formulation that should be discussed openly are hidden in bureaucratic decisions 
concerning "appropriate" discount rates, for example.  Recognizing multiple values and 
multiple vernaculars, encouraging open discussion of values—pluralism—can lead to 
negotiation and reformulation of problems as people develop new, sometimes more 
similar, "mental models" of problem situations.  
One cannot blame ecologists for wanting to join forces with economists and offer 
more comprehensive accounting—in dollar values—of "ecosystem services" in addition 
to the measurable market values for products and outcomes of ecological functioning.  
What ecologists miss, however, is that the pursuit of a monistic evaluation of policy 
measured in dollars faces them with a terrible dilemma. Can ecologists be confident that, 
if they pass the task of valuing ecological change to economists, or if they themselves 
engage in the economic valuation of ecosystem services, important "ecological values" 
will be adequately valued?  By "ecological values," we mean the whole range of 
(economic) values that humans derive from ecological systems, including services, 
provision of material resources, aesthetic values attributed to pristine and/or healthy 
systems, recreation, spiritual, and bequest values (Mitchell and Carson, p. 61).  For the 
sake of definiteness, we mention examples such as the values of biodiversity and 
ecological complexity.  What is crucial here is to recognize how difficult it would be to 
construct a comprehensive accounting of these values within the disciplinary definition of 
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value as understood in mainstream economics.  It will be difficult precisely because of 
mismatch between the production of those goods—which involves complex, inter-related 
ecological processes in which contributions of parts of the system are often impossible to 
separate into discrete units—and the methods of economists, which demand the 
identification of discrete units of good in order to associate dollar values with precisely 
specifiable changes in those units, so that consumers or respondents can choose their 
preferred trade-off.  Specifying changes in units of goods does not map clearly or neatly 
onto changes in identifiable, discrete components of the ecological processes.   
In the following Part, we develop the Ecologists' Dilemma in more detail, by 
articulating the intellectual and informational costs of forcing ecological information 
affecting social values into a monistic, monetary vernacular.  At the heart of this dilemma 
is the emergence and growing dominance of the ecosystem services methodology, which 
measures (in dollars) the economic contribution of certain aspects of nature (conceived as 
units of goods and services) to human welfare.  The very success of this approach, 
however, worries us because this quantified approach is becoming so dominant in 
ecological economics that the field seems at this point to be adopting monism by default, 
without even canvassing for alternative approaches.  In fact, there has been some 
questioning of the growing emphasis on ecosystem services.  This is a helpful sign, but 
we see little positive movement toward more comprehensive analytical or valuational 
tools. If we seek an integrated and comprehensive system for evaluating environmental 
and ecological change, we must embrace and develop a pluralistic, but integrated, system 
of evaluation and policy.  Such an integrated system of evaluation would of course 
involve economic indicators and considerations—but it would be pluralistic in the sense 
that it counts values other than units of human welfare measured in terms of aggregated 
WTP.  The pluralistic approach subsumes the monistic valuation exercise. 
Part II: Economic Monism and Ecology: A Problem of Units of Analysis 
 Can economic monism provide an adequate account of values gained and lost, 
such as the value of biodiversity and ecological complexity, as a result of anthropogenic 
change to ecological systems?  The answer to this question hinges on whether the 
complex and long-term impacts recognized by ecological experts can be reasonably 
expected to be captured by an analysis of impacts of ecological change on human welfare 
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measures understood as aggregations of individuals' WTP for the benefits.  Addressing 
this question, however, results immediately in controversy.   
Will the monistic system of dollar-measured accounting be constructed according 
to the strict rules of economic analysis, as developed within the field of economics, or 
will there be some alternative to this dominant paradigm so that ecological values that 
have only tenuous and unquantifiable implications for measurable human welfare can be 
included in an "economic" analysis?  The ambiguity, in this situation, of the term 
"economic" reflects the ecologists' dilemma.  If "economic" benefits and costs are 
understood according to the disciplinary definition developed in mainstream 
environmental economics, then references to benefits and costs are to the effect of policy 
changes on the welfare of individual's, as marked by their own assessment of their well-
being (Bockstael et al., 2000).  We should note that these mainstream authors do not 
assert monism about environmental values; indeed, they mention both that there may be 
alternative conceptions of value and that, even within the economic conception, if only 
quantifiable measures of WTP are counted, there will no doubt be social values that will 
not be counted within that precise definition.  Many mainstream economists accept that, 
in the political process, some value aspects of a situation will simply come down to 
judgments not based on economic data, and leading economists, such as Sen (2002), have 
explicitly rejected monism.  We do not mean, then, to imply all economists are monists.  
Our point, rather, is that the stampede of ecological economists toward monism in 
practice must ignore the very reasonable position of many mainstream economists that 
there are environmental and social values that will escape economists’ measurement.  
The argument, then, comes down to which ecological services will be measured and how 
they will be measured in order to achieve—as ecological economists seem to try to be 
doing—a monistic system of valuation on which all values are potentially expressed as 
WTP. 
Most mainstream environmental economists have no problem, in principle, with 
attributing WTP value to ecosystems, including both "use" values, such as tertiary 
treatment of sewage, and "existence" values—the value placed on the very existence of a 
pristine ecosystem, for example.  The problem, rather, is whether there exist today, or 
could exist in the foreseeable future, methods that can provide, not only "in-principle-
 9 
possible," but also "in-reality-available" estimates of the value of ecosystems. Can 
estimates of individuals' WTP, measured by an acceptable method of estimating 
economic choice behavior—as measured in either actual or hypothetical markets-- be 
expected to capture all or most of the values that ecologists associate with ecological 
functioning, processes, and complexities?   
 With this context set, we can state the ecologists' dilemma concisely and 
rigorously:  Should ecologists, who wish to assert that natural systems and their features 
have value, accept the economists' "disciplinary definition" of value and the 
methodological strictures that come with it?  Or, should they relax that definition, 
allowing the more liberal counting of values of "ecosystem services"?  We proceed by 
examining, in turn, the prospects for capturing ecological values in a useful economic 
analysis if ecologists give an affirmative or a negative answer to this dilemmatic 
question. 
The disciplinary definition has been elaborated with a variety of taxonomies of 
environmental values, taxonomies that usually apply to both "market" and "non-market" 
goods (Freeman, 2003; Mitchell and Carson, 1989). Economists have offered a variety of 
classifications of benefits (goods) and damages (bads) derived from natural systems 
(Freeman, 1993, pp. 12-13), and ecological values.  In order to explore whether important 
ecological goods such as maintaining biological diversity and ecosystem functions are 
likely to be included in an exclusively economic accounting, we follow loosely the 
taxonomy offered by Mitchell and Carson in their respected book on the contingent 
valuation method (Mitchell and Carson, 1989, p.61).  Mitchell and Carson have two large 
categories, "use" and "existence" benefits that can be measured, and illustrate these 
categories with the example of improvement of freshwater quality.  Under "use" values, 
they include, for example, as a benefit of improvements of water quality, "enhanced 
general ecosystem support, (food chain)," as one category of value.  Can economists 
provide reasonable estimates of people's WTP for goods such as this? 
Economists differ in their degrees of optimism on this question.  Until recently, 
indeed, most economists who considered this question argued that, unless an ecological 
change can be associated with a measurable change in a good or service, it could not be 
registered as either a benefit or a cost in economic terms (Baxter, 1974; Freeman, 1993; 
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Freeman, 1995).  Samuelson’s (1954) reservations about the practical limits of our ability 
to measure values related to pure public goods hold sway in many quarters.  For example, 
Freeman, in a "qualification" in the conclusion of his comprehensive account of the 
measurement of environmental values in 1993, referred to such values as "biodiversity, 
the reduction of ecological risks, and the protection of basic ecosystem functions," and 
stated:  "When policies to protect biodiversity or ecosystems are proposed, economists 
may be able to say something sensible about the costs of the policies; but except where 
nonuse values are involved and where people use ecosystems (for example, for 
commercial harvesting of fish or for recreation), economists will not be able to contribute 
comparable welfare measures on the benefit side of the equation." (Freeman, 1993, p. 
485.)  
Today, there seems to be more interest, and confidence, in placing dollar values 
on ecological benefits such as "enhanced general ecosystem support" by devising 
ingenious ways to estimate welfare measures for such goods.  In the second edition of the 
1993 book cited above, Freeman (2003, pp. 458-459) weakens his qualification, arguing 
that—at least in principle—it is possible to estimate values of "ecological services," 
within an accounting of individual's willingness-to-pay; but, as will be noted below, he 
sets what would appear to be impossibly high requirements for actually measuring such 
values. 
This is where the distinction, mentioned above, between "in-principle" and "in-
reality" methods that can actually measure ecological goods comes to bear.  While some 
economists may expect a breakthrough, a new method to measure the currently 
unmeasurable aspects of dynamic changes affecting "ecological values" seems as likely 
as a global market in individually transferable carbon emission permits.  In practice, 
many crucial economic values associated with ecological change may never be 
measurable.  Economists, as noted above, list both market and non-market benefits and 
costs of ecological change.  The value of market goods can be determined by examining 
actual transactions.  In some cases, non-market goods can be measured as indirectly 
"revealed preferences," as in the hedonic method of calculating travel cost (where values 
for a good can be inferred from costs incurred to access the good, or estimates of values 
can be inferred from differentials in home sale prices, for example), where associated 
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market transactions allow the imputation of willingness to pay for the good.  In other 
cases, especially where no "use" is associated with the valuing of a good, no market 
behavior can guide estimates, so economists have developed the "contingent valuation" 
method and associated methods that construct situations in which respondents "state" 
their preference in a hypothetical market, a questionnaire, or a bidding game.  Values 
such as "existence" values—the value derived from just knowing that something exists or 
that an aspect of the natural world is protected—can only be estimated using stated 
preference methods.  Despite some concern about the comparability of revealed and 
stated preference estimations, most economists are developing ways to aggregate the 
values attributed by these methods, and hence they treat these approaches as 
complementary, allowing their aggregation in a cost-benefit analysis that can, in 
principle, accommodate both market and non-market goods (Freeman, 2003, pp. 456-
457). 
Freeman, while apparently more optimistic about the development of rigorous 
methods to measure ecological benefits in 2003 than he was in 1993, sets out a frightful 
challenge if one were to attempt to use standard tools for measuring stated value, the 
"good" for which respondents must express a WTP.  "To estimate the economic value of 
a basic ecosystem function, we need to know the link between that function and the 
ecosystem service flows that it supports.  This will not always be easy to uncover," he 
says.  This understatement is followed shortly with an acknowledgment that "In fact 
some aspects of ecosystem behavior might be fundamentally unpredictable." Freeman 
also notes that this link might be made by conceiving the ecosystem as a "production 
process," but then one faces the complication that "in terms of production theory, 
ecosystems are multiproduct production systems in which jointness in production is 
likely to be a dominant feature" (Freeman, 2003, p. 459; Norton, 1988).   
The difficulties involved notwithstanding, economic analysis requires that, if 
ecological values are to be included within the disciplinary definition of value accepted in 
economics, there is a well-defined change that a consumer or respondent can react to, 
whether the behavior is registered in real or hypothetical markets. The marginal approach 
of economic value involves not absolute, but comparative, trade-off value and this 
requires a precise characterization of the "good" involved, which may in the case of 
 12 
ecological changes prove impossible in practice.  To illustrate this point, consider the 
"good," listed by Mitchell and Carson, of "enhanced general ecosystem support (food 
chain)."  Could the value for this good be inferred from actual behavior, either directly or 
indirectly?  Apparently not directly, since enhancements of food chains are not traded in 
markets. Could the value of this good be attributed to consumers indirectly, for example, 
if an enhanced food chain would perhaps lower seafood prices, resulting in welfare 
gains?   In order to estimate the decrease in seafood price, one would have to know how, 
and to what degree, the food chain improvement, over what period of time, affected 
future prices.  In order to fulfill Freeman's requirements, one would have to be able to 
specify the "production process" if one were to assess the indirect effect of food chain 
enhancement on seafood prices.  Further, if the food chain is considered as a contribution 
to a production process, it clearly involves jointness in production, requiring even more 
detailed information of causal nexuses in complex ecological system.  Information 
necessary to accomplish a precise characterization of such a good is unknown, and much 
of it is virtually unknowable.3   
Perhaps one might construct hypothetical markets in food web enhancement, and 
seek stated-preference data to support estimation of WTP for changes in ecological 
values. There are two approaches to characterizing changes: (1) to identify a 
"commodity" that respondents may be willing to pay for; and (2) to develop "scenarios" 
which embody varied concentrations of certain valued characteristics, and asking 
respondents what they would pay for these varied concentrations.  
1.  The "commodity" approach, which estimates the value of a commodity by 
developing a hypothetical market, assigns value to a commodity carefully described to 
respondents.  They are asked to respond as if they were considering a purchase of a 
private good in a free market, simulating a market transaction by means of a 
questionnaire, interview, or bidding game.  The commodity approach seems to work well 
3 Even if it were knowable, and we have an “easy case” of an environmental good with 
associated use values, the use of revealed preference data is not without its own intrinsic 
limits.  Revealed preference approaches hinge on actual behavior in actual markets and 
thus struggle to provide value estimates of a priori changes or of “out of sample” 
environmental changes.  Thus, if the predicted changes in the food chain fall outside our 
range of experience, past behavior may be a poor guide to the values at stake in the new 
scenario.  
 13 
                                                 
if the commodity described has reasonable analogues in private markets, and the behavior 
of offering a price for similar entities is familiar to the respondents, such as paying for 
upgraded utility services. On the other hand, this approach works much less well for 
environmental "goods" that people have difficulty envisioning as commodities.  Then 
respondents tend to be confused and offer unreliable or protest answers.4  Complex 
functions of ecosystems that are essential to system support, but yield no easily 
measurable units of good, are examples of environmental goods without reasonable 
market analogues.  As Vatn and Bromley (1994) argue, support functions of ecosystems 
are "invisible" unless one knows a great deal about the structure and function of an 
ecological system, often more than trained ecologists in fact know about such systems.  
So, attempts to evaluate "ecological values" by creating "commodities" would certainly 
undervalue the "invisible" functions that are necessary to support, in turn, the production 
of goods and services that are considered valued commodities.  This problem results from 
a more general disconnect between the language of commodities and the language of 
ecology:  the units of analysis in ecology—systems—are not amenable to description as 
discrete commodities (Vatn and Bromley, 1994). The commodity approach, then, cannot 
capture those values, from biodiversity to ecosystem functions, that are most often cited 
as ecological values. 
2.  An alternative approach, endorsed by Mitchell and Carson (1989), for 
example, is for economic researchers to outline multiple complex and holistic 
"scenarios," which differ in a specifiable way.  Respondents are then asked to report their 
willingness-to-pay for the difference among scenarios.  Moving away from exclusive 
valuation of commodities in hypothetical markets via analogy to actual, free markets, 
Mitchell and Carson suggest using a "referendum" model, asking respondents, for 
example, how much they would be willing to be taxed to bring about an environmental 
improvement.  This decision model/analogy avoids the atomistic demands of the 
commodity approach, and may at first glance seem much more attractive to those 
4 Lay respondents struggle to appreciate what “a 10 ppb change in average ambient 
concentrations of a particular airborne pollutant” actually means.  If explaining a 
complex yet clearly identifiable “unit” of change is met with difficulty, imagine the 
difficulty in communicating an even more nuanced change in ecological functionings 
when the unit is a system and change involves sophisticated ecological knowledge. 
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concerned to include systemic and other ecological values in any accounting of 
environmental values.  
Shifting to the scenario approach still requires that the key differences associated 
with policy interventions be made clear to respondents, and the respondents must be able 
to make trade-offs over those differences if the monistic project of representing all 
environmental values in commensurable, WTP terms is to be completed.  Completing this 
task, in turn, requires identifying and measuring several types of values, by use of a 
variety of methods.      
So, if ecologists in the ecological economics field choose the first horn of the 
dilemma, they should not expect those methods to provide anything like comprehensive 
estimates of ecological values for the foreseeable future, because even if one accepts the 
in-principle possibility of developing such methods, economists are very far from the 
methodological breakthroughs that would be necessary to actually estimate those values 
(not to mention the costliness of available practices!).  Even if the validity of positive 
economics and monism were uncontested, the practical limits of economic valuation in a 
cost-benefit framework are substantial.  These practical limits may seriously constrain the 
usefulness of conventional economic valuation to inform evaluation of pure 
environmental public goods or of scenarios with which we lack much experience. 
Some ecologists, becoming impatient with these disciplinary strictures, and the 
remarkable and intransigent methodological problems they pose, have expressed 
frustration that strict adherence to the disciplinary definition of economic value makes it 
difficult to measure and assign dollar values to highly valued aspects of ecosystems, and 
have recommended the relaxation of the strict rules of economic valuation.  Ecologists 
and others, grasping the second horn of the ecologists' dilemma, have thus proposed 
calculating the total contribution of natural systems to economic well-being through the 
delivery of "ecosystem services" (Costanza et al., 1997; Dailey, 1997).  Advocates of this 
approach measure, by whatever means available, the economic impacts of various 
ecological processes and outcomes on human well-being.  They have thus relaxed the 
disciplinary definitions and rules that allow careful comparison of resource elements on a 
marginal basis.  The value of a resource element, within the disciplinary system, is the 
difference in value between that element and the value of the next best substitute.  
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Advocates of ecosystem service accounting, on the other hand, often offer either 
"absolute" values—the value that would be lost if the service in question were to be 
completely lost—or they estimate the value of an element as what it would cost to 
provide the service, once performed by natural systems for free, through technological 
fixes. 
Mainstream environmental economists have reacted strongly to this proposed 
alteration of disciplinary definitions and rules.  Bockstael et al. (2000, p. 2) have referred 
to the large numbers estimated by advocates of the relaxed definition as the aggregated 
contribution of natural systems to human well-being as "absurd," because the total value 
of these services exceeds the aggregated annual total of global Gross National Product, 
implying people are willing to pay more than they make to protect ecosystem services.  
Mainstream economists argue that the advocates of the relaxed definition have rejected 
the "current concepts of economic value," and they are asking questions that are not 
relevant to the concept of economic value as it is used disciplinarily and in the 
development of cost-benefit analyses (Bockstael et al. 2000, p. 2).  This disagreement, 
then, is at the heart of what we call the ecologists' dilemma. 
Note that the ecologists' dilemma arises once a commitment is made to monism.  
One can avoid the dilemma simply by embracing an explicitly pluralistic conception of 
environmental values, as suggested by Bockstael et al. (2000).  We have made much of 
the difference between the two approaches (mainstream economists’ and ecologists’ like 
Costanza) to measuring ecological services, but our central point is that, regardless of 
their differences on how to define and measure impacts of ecological processes on human 
welfare, these approaches are equally committed to expressing environmental values as 
increments in individual welfare. 
To see, on a deeper level why monism in valuation represents a danger to the 
future of ecological economics, one must grasp the model-dependent and metaphor-
guided aspect of models, including models of preference and choice.  Return briefly to 
Freeman's discussion of the possibility of articulating the value of ecological goods 
jointly produced by ecosystems.  Freeman (2003, p. 459), attributing the solution to 
Barbier, suggests that one can "think of the relevant components of the ecosystem as 
being involved in a production process," and then try to identify "changes in service 
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flows in response to changes in ecosystem conditions."  This is a telling point.  Freeman 
recognizes that, in order to measure an ecological service produced by an ecosystem, one 
can "think of it as" a production system, which is only one of many alternative ways one 
can "think of" an ecosystem.  Freeman refers to this decision as a question of "model 
uncertainty," but this is a misnomer: it is a choice of a model considered appropriate for a 
given task.  There is no underlying “true” model of an ecosystem that may or may never 
be observable.  The choice of an appropriate metaphor is not a matter of uncertainty that 
may be remedied by more data—it is instead a choice of a guiding metaphor which, in 
turn, highlights some values and hides others.  Barbier's approach generates dollar values 
on the assumption that ecosystems are production processes for human goods.  This 
assumption, itself, is not based on empirical data, but rather on what Barbier thinks is 
important, what he wants to know about the system, and on what he values. 
The point here is that, if we recognize that the decision to model ecological values 
in the economic framework is a choice among multiple possible metaphors and models, 
then the decision as to what is important to measure rests on a value judgment.  The 
decision to treat nature as a production system for the purpose of measuring economic 
values, was a decision not to employ alternative metaphors that would highlight 
alternative pathways and alternative values.  This choice exercises an underlying value 
which in turn determines how the model will be constructed.  Ecologists' contribution to 
the valuation of ecological goods, will probably not be, at least not solely, one of 
identifying causal pathways once an economist has already chosen an economics-based, 
production-related model for characterizing value.  The ecologists contribution will be, 
rather, to illuminate the multiplicity of ways we can understand ecosystems, and in 
relating multiple values and kinds of values to ecological change by identifying and 
helping communities to choose alternative guiding metaphors for ecological processes.  
In Part III, we further explore the crucial role of metaphors in understanding and 
evaluating ecological change.  
Part III: Post-Positivist Ecology 
 In a series of papers with several co-authors, Steward Pickett has explored the 
possibilities of using lessons of ecology to better understand the lived environment, 
including lessons they have drawn from their study of the Baltimore Long-Term 
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Ecological Research site (LTER)  (Pickett and Cadenasso, 2006; Pickett et al., 2004).   
Advocating the use of the ecosystem concept as a useful tool for communication among 
scientists and among scientists and the interested public, including stakeholders and 
government agencies (Pickett and Cadenasso, 2002, 5; Pickett et al., 2004), these authors 
identify several "frameworks" that have been useful in Baltimore, and they think these 
may be useful in other contexts as well;  These are:  (i) "spatial patch dynamics…", (ii) 
the watershed as an integrative tool,"  and (iii) "the human ecosystem framework" 
(Pickett and Cadenasso, 2006, 114) these authors frame the question as one of choosing a 
model appropriate to one's purpose, arguing that "The richness of topics, complexity of 
model domains, and range of behaviors that models can exhibit suggest that ecosystem 
models can be used for diverse purposes" (Pickett and Cadenasso, 2002, 5; Pickett and 
Cadenasso, 2006; Kolasa and Pickett, 200x)  This pragmatic, constructivist, and 
instrumentalist approach to models is linked by Pickett and co-authors with an explicit 
endorsement of the importance of metaphors associated with ecosystems, seeing them as 
having a creative and generative role in science; and as valuable in communicating 
ecological ideas to the public and policy makers in public discourse.   
What is really fresh in this work is that it is based on a recognition that human 
purposes—goals, values, priorities—are integral to ecological model-building.5  Pickett 
and Cadenasso (2002, 6) say, "This area of communication includes education, the 
media, policy making, and management.  In such public uses, the precision and narrow 
focus of technical terms is eschewed in favor of richness of connotation and in support of 
societally important, if sometimes controversial, values. "  Substantively, Pickett and 
Cadenasso also advocate the identification of ecological systems with spatially defined 
areas, and also advocate encouragement of recognition of systems as "places" with social 
meaning and endowed with "responsibility and empowerment" (Pickett and Cadenasso, 
2002, 6).  This work is so important because, drawing heavily on recent thought in the 
philosophy of science, Pickett and colleagues are creating an integrated dialogue about 
5 We do not mean to suggest this group of authors is alone in making this dramatic move, 
nor in their application of ecological insights to policy discussions.  See, especially, 
Clark, (2002) and Peter Taylor (2005) 
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environmental policy and scientific research that is post-positivist and self-reflexive 
about the choices that are made in building models and framing environmental problems.  
 We believe ecological economists should respond to this opportunity to re-think 
the relationship between the models we use to describe natural processes and the models 
we use to evaluate changes in their processes.  Pickett and the others just cited in the last 
footnote are advocating no less than an inversion of our usual thinking about science, 
values, and policy.  The old positivist model advocated first gathering descriptive 
information and data, and then predicting impacts of actions, followed by a 
microeconomic estimate of the dollars-worth of impacts on the welfare of consumers.   
Norton (2005) calls this "the Serial View of Science and Policy" and criticizes it in more 
detail. 
Pickett and colleagues argue that, at its deepest level the ecosystem concept rests 
on metaphors, and these metaphors connect our values and emotions with our choices of 
models.  In order to be applied to real-world situations, the ecosystem concept demands 
experimentation with new analogies and interpretations, and this level of "experiment is 
deep enough to connect to our values, fears, and aspirations.  They do not propose that 
we first describe changing systems and then evaluate the changes according to a single 
computation of the effects on human welfare.  Instead, they embrace an open-ended 
search for many partial, but complementary, models that tell stories from multiple points 
of view, recognizing that this search will be guided by our diverse values and purposes.  
Taylor (2005, 226-227) refers to such an approach to research as "reflexive" ("applying 
one's method to one's own work") and as involving "practical reflexivity" … "that takes 
into account the range of practical conditions that enable researchers to build and gain 
support for their representations."6 
6 We have, with our own set of colleagues, developed what we call a "two-phased 
process" of policy formation and evaluation.  The phases, while intermixed in time, are 
characterized by the different frame given the questions addressed and the purposes 
driving choices.  In the Reflective Phase goals are discussed and strategies are formed.  
In adaptive management, the reflective phase is very important because it is in this phase 
that one evaluates outcomes of prior actions—and prepares  new experiments to reduce 
uncertainty (Norton, 2005).  In the Action Phase actions are undertaken based on agreed-
upon goals according to agreed-upon strategies.  Again, in a system of management that 
is functioning adaptively, actions will be taken both to address perceived problems, but 
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 Rather than leave the work of Pickett and colleagues at this rather abstract level, 
we cite the development of Aldo Leopold's views on science, management, and 
evaluation. Leopold, the great American Forester-Philosopher, constructed a plausible, 
but complex conceptual model for understanding evaluation ecologically.  Leopold's 
changing views on wolf management  represents a process of self-reflexive modeling and 
it illustrates how a rich understanding of reflexive model-building can change both 
perception and sense of responsibility simultaneously and inseparably.   By using 
Leopold's transformation as a historical case that can be evaluated with hindsight, we can 
begin to see how metaphors, model building, management and science can all be brought 
together in something we would today call, "adaptive management".  What we think has 
not been adequately recognized—and so Norton (2005) emphasized it--is the 
inseparability of Leopold's choices in modeling and monitoring from his consideration of 
values and responsibilities.  Far from shying away from values in managing and in 
building scientific models, Leopold often used fundamental metaphors for understanding 
ecological phenomena—and human responsibilities regarding those phenomena.  
 As one spectacular example, we refer to Leopold's famous simile, "thinking like a 
mountain," which was the title of a brief essay that criticized his earlier wolf eradication 
programs; that essay was published in Leopold's1949 classic, A Sand County Almanac 
and Essays Here and There.   Leopold built upon a conceptual base created in the earlier 
essay, "Marshland Elegy," where he sketched out three separate "scales" of time, a micro-
scale of human perception of time (which Leopold illustrated by writing impatiently of 
waiting for the cranes to arrive at the crane marsh), ecological time (the scale on which 
the cranes had established a viable habitat within a marsh system evolving out of the ice 
ages), and geological, deep time (during which the mountains, lakes and marshes were 
gouged and re-shaped by geological processes).  Leopold left his reader with the idea that 
human beings cannot understand their affairs realistically, unless they see them as 
embedded within a larger geological and evolutionary story.  These processes, he said, 
which were expressed in the longstanding migration of the cranes, make the cranes "the 
also to reduce uncertainty and learn from doing (Norton et al., 1998; Norton and 
Steinemann, 2001; Norton, 2005). 
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symbol of our untamable past, of that sweep of millennia which underlies and conditions 
the daily affairs of birds and men" (Leopold, 1949, p. 97). 
 Leopold continues this theme of multiple time scales in the subsequent essay, 
"Thinking Like a Mountain," opening his thoughts with the observation that "only the 
mountain has lived long enough to listen objectively to the howl of the wolf" (Leopold, 
1949, p. 129).  While the essay focuses initially on the death of an old she-wolf, Leopold 
makes it clear that her death was a metaphor for the extinction of the wolves from the 
Southwest Territories:  the simile illustrates Leopold's recognition that systems formed 
over decades and centuries, if violently altered, will suffer long-term, ecological 
impacts—loss of vegetative cover, erosion, loss of topsoil-- as well as desired, immediate 
impacts such as an expanded deer herd.  When Leopold lamented not "thinking like a 
mountain," he was criticizing himself for not having considered the impacts of his actions 
on multiple scales of time and as affecting systems of larger spatial scale.   Similarly, 
ecologists' contribution to valuation studies is not limited to providing causal detail 
within a particular, constrained, economic model, but also exploring alternative 
metaphors one might use to understand and evaluate ecological change. 
Learning to think like a mountain is learning to think pluralistically: it is not to 
stop thinking economically, but it is to start thinking in terms of long-term ecological 
impacts in addition to economic analysis.  It is to adopt a more complex model of nature, 
and to learn to evaluate impacts on multiple scales.  When Leopold figured out that his 
predator eradication program—a great success in the short run--had led to over-
population of deer and a destruction of the vegetative cover, he was forced to shift his 
"mental model" from an economic calculation of economic impacts of improved deer 
hunting to a more complex, ecologically informed model of the situation.  What is 
interesting and important is that he simultaneously and inseparably accepted 
responsibility to submit future policy proposals to another layer of analysis—an analysis 
of the violence and the likelihood of significant impacts on ecological systems that are 
usually slower-changing.7 
7 In this paper, we concentrate on redirecting evaluative discourse, and have not said 
nearly enough about the importance of developing institutions that are capable of 
addressing future challenges.  See Bromley (2006) as providing a complement to our 
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 This old example, we think, illustrates the richness of Pickett's use of the 
ecosystem concept to which he attributes a very flexible, technical definition applicable 
at many scales and in many contexts, but relies heavily upon metaphor and modeling to 
bring the technical definition to bear upon particular cases.  The fleshing out of an 
ecosystem model on the ground is part of understanding what is going on, and it involves 
highly metaphorical thinking.  In Leopold's case, the new metaphor allowed him to 
balance short-term economic thinking against long-term ecological thinking.  The 
metaphor of "mountain-thinking," (and "watershed thinking", and "wetland-thinking.") is, 
first of all, a re-orientation of thought—a shift in both scale and in "problem 
formulation", but it is also an act of accepting responsibility for all the future effects of 
our choices that are foreseeable in the present.   Leopold's guiding metaphor tells us to 
see the effects of our action in a larger ecological scale.   
Leopold's model choice, driven by his over-arching ecological metaphor of the 
"mountain," is both an act of scientific insight and an embrace of responsibility.  The 
metaphorical dimension that expresses itself in the choice of a guiding metaphor is then 
activated, applied by the specification of a "domain and a variety of features".  This 
middle dimension is described as embodying "the specifications needed to address the 
many and real or hypothetical situations that the [technical] definition might apply to" 
(Pickett and Cadenasso, 2002, p.1). 
 Leopold's metaphorical leap into a multi-scalar, pluralistic system shaped the 
models he used both to understand and to evaluate future proposals for game 
management.  The metaphorical shift opened up new possibilities in the construction of 
models, and new opportunities to evaluate policy proposals on multiple temporal scales 
and according to multiple criteria.  Leopold's pluralistic approach, which we understand 
as a first try at specifying a multi-scalar, adaptive approach to management (without the 
label, "adaptive management" itself), seems to us to be the most promising approach to 
the evaluation of ecological change available.   
Part IV: Ecologically Sensitive Evaluation: A Sketch 
argument by proposing that environmental economists, once they give up their pricing 
emphasis, adopt the role of institutional analysts in the tradition of Veblen, Common, and 
the "old institutionalists."  Also see Norton (2005) for an extended discussion of this and 
related issues. 
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As was noted in passing, above, most environmental/ecological "problems" 
emerge as "messes," as what Rittel and Webber (1973) called "wicked problems": they 
do not emerge as well-defined problems that are formulated similarly by different 
participants in the discussion.  There will, on the contrary, be varied complaints and 
varied explanations of what the problem is, often associated with varied value positions 
and perspectives of the participants.  Positivist science, in these early stages of problem 
formulation, is irrelevant.  One cannot test hypotheses—indeed one cannot even know 
what hypotheses to test—if participants in the discourse differ radically about the nature 
of the problem at hand.  The positivists bypass the "messes" that are key to beginning an 
ongoing, iterative, public dialogue.  It is in this messy dialogue about goals and 
aspirations, however, that metaphors and similes allow the reconstruction of a problem by 
virtue of reconstructing the models used to characterize that problem. What is useful at 
this stage is a discussion of values, goals, and aspirations, interspersed with attempts to 
achieve short-term and intermediate goals that can be agreed-upon.  
We suggest a shift in the unit of analysis to development paths (Vatn and 
Bromley, 1994; Norton, 2005).  Development paths are ways our community/place can 
develop over time and into the future.  Development paths can be thought of, 
alternatively, as scenarios, but here scenarios are used creatively and reflectively, to 
explore and evaluate possible scenarios according to multiple criteria and not, as in 
economic models, as a methodological tool to measure welfare change.  Proposed 
policies can be understood as interventions to modify or stabilize systemic effects on 
community or place, and simulations can be used to explore how policy options might 
lead to varied scenarios.  Goals can be set, not as abstract principles that demand 
maximization of a single index value (e.g., economic welfare) but as descriptions of 
favored development paths.  Proposed policies, and the development paths they are 
modeled to shape and encourage, can then be evaluated on multiple criteria, including 
economic criteria (such as job creation and comparative efficiency of different 
institutional means to achieve improvements on key criteria), but also including longer-
term impacts on ecological systems.  So, we are am proposing an alternative approach to 
evaluation of environmental change which shifts the unit of evaluative analysis from 
WTP for atomized, discrete commodities, or clearly describable changes in scenarios, to 
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development paths that can be evaluated according to impacts on multiple scales of time 
and space.  In this way we can choose development paths to protect a range of human 
values, recognizing the multiple ways humans value nature. 
 Where do these criteria come from?  They should be worked out in the process of 
building models that are responsive to social problems.  This process--what we call 
"adaptive management"--ideally includes public involvement as well as agency and 
managerial participation in an ongoing process that attempts to learn by doing.  
Individuals and groups will argue that certain features and processes are of value; further 
discussion will explore whether these features and processes can be associated with a 
measurable indicator. Rejecting the positivist model of describing environmental change 
and then assessing welfare impacts on consumers for each and every commodity or 
service before and after an intervention would actually be very liberating for ecological 
economists (Bromley, 2006).  It would also bring the system they use to evaluate change 
more in line with the lessons of ecology.  Discussion of environmental policy will be 
reformed as debate turns from how values will be expressed as measurable dollar 
quantities to proposals of varied economic and ecological indicators, proposals of 
management goals with respect to those indicators, and discussion of priorities among 
goals and indicators. 
 We are suggesting that ecological economics abandon the artificial mindscape of 
positivism. That mindscape encouraged the serial treatment of science, the completion of 
an account of the key variables constituting a problem before values and human purposes 
can be consulted and brought to bear upon problem formulation.  It has also imposed 
upon us, relying on the unrealistic and artificial distinction between descriptive and 
prescriptive discourse, the dualistic discourse that still separates ecologists and 
economists.   The dualistic, serial view of science and policy is a hopeless model because 
we cannot know what science is relevant, or what data to collect, until we know what is 
important.  As long as problem formulation remains unresolved—as it typically does in 
unproductive management processes--it is impossible to know what data is relevant.  
Discussion deteriorates into turf wars among disciplines, all urging their particular data 
and analysis as definitive.  In place of the serial view, we suggest making the process of 
evaluation—and the process of problem re-formulation— endogenous to adaptive 
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management, and that we adopt an experimental approach to understanding and 
evaluating changes in social values entailed by human impacts on natural systems.  This 
experimental approach—experimenting with different metaphors and "models" to 
characterize a problem—exemplifies Pickett's third "aspect" of model-building.  This 
third aspect must embody a reflexive, self-critical and other-critical process of choosing 
appropriate models for communicating about, and working to solve, environmental 
problems. 
 Making evaluation a sub-process of ongoing adaptive management processes  
should make us—philosophers, economists, and ecologists alike—aware of the choices 
we make when we "model" deterioration or recovery of ecological systems.  The choices 
we make in scaling models, in locating boundaries—both spatio-temporal and 
conceptual, and in describing the mechanisms and processes driving a problem--must be 
carried out at the metaphorical level as described by Pickett and colleagues.  At this deep 
level, the metaphors we choose and the models we build re-conceptualize "messes" as 
emergent problems capable of encouraging learning through doing.  This learning can 
only take place, however, if goals and values are open for public debate in an ongoing 
discourse that encourages rich metaphors and diverse values. 
 In place of the methodological debates about how to force all values into a single 
measure, this approach offers a public discourse focused on choosing appropriate 
"indicators" of sustainability.  Choices of indicators reflect the choosers' values in the 
indirect sense that choosing to monitor some ecological process is evidence that that 
process is of interest to the choosers, or at least that it is associated with some other factor 
of interest to them.  So, discussion of environmental values can be absorbed into a 
community-level process of choosing some small set of indicators which, if followed and 
stabilized, would protect most of the community's values.  Given shared and varied 
values drawn from nature, the community decides what indicators to monitor.  Values 
people have remain important in the process, but their values feed into an ongoing 
process of discussion, debate, and management experiments.  Crucial to these 
experiments is reflexive model-building directed at characterizing and communicating 
the nature of perceived threats to social values.   Embedding the search for models and 
guiding metaphors in public discourse encourages problem-based model-building—a 
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process that in turn encourages "social learning" at the deepest, metaphorical, level. (See 
Figure 1.) 
 This new approach does not decide, before doing research, what kind of values 
will be found.  Rather, we advocate elicitations following the important methodological 
breakthroughs of Kempton et al. (1995), who begin the characterization of people's 
environmental values with open-ended interviews.  In this way they can maintain the 
richness and diversity—and look for the similarities—among varied respondents' 
answers. 
 Also, the context of evaluation is shifted.  Evaluation will no longer be monistic:  
proposed policies will be evaluated according to multiple criteria applicable at multiple 
spatial scales—impacts on a list of indicators that is currently hypothesized to reflect, at 
least roughly, the values of participants who helped to choose them.  As various problem 
models are introduced into the public discourse, as various metaphors are tried out, there 
is the possibility of reconciling problem formulation through the adoption of common 
models characterizing the problem.   In successful cases, these exercises in community 
model-building can lead to the kind of social learning that can "re-model" complex and 
wicked problems and improve communication by disentangling messes into addressable 
problems.  In this process, public policies and actions will be hypothesized to affect 
various valued and monitored processes.  Proposed actions can then be compared 
according to their likely effects on the list of monitored processes.  And these 
comparisons, if taken together, can function as a multi-criteria evaluation of possible 
actions.    
Key to all these connections and learning about them is the creative choice of 
appropriate metaphors, and the development of effective and transparent models for 
seeing the likely effects of possible choices that will determine development paths—and 
what gets protected—as we move into the future.  As these models operationalize chosen 
metaphorical representations, attention then shifts back to evaluating the effects of 
proposed actions and policies on those monitored processes (indicators).  Adaptive 
management and social learning, on this approach, are given the chance to address 
problems iteratively, embodying plural values in multiple criteria, and by focusing 
attention on important choices that will constitute the future.  
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Figure 1:  Metaphor and Iteration:  We need metaphors and "models" to understand 
any complex process; Metaphors and "stories" of a place, such as Leopold's Thinking 
Like a Mountain, re-orient science, creating models more appropriate to our values;  in 
turn, this leads to more useful science (adaptive management) and, most importantly, to 
acceptance of responsibility for long-term impacts.  This progression, in turn, encourages 
yet more meaningful science and adaptive management. 
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